Basis of Appeal
Trevor Milton’s appeal of his conviction on fraud charges focuses on several critical legal errors that his defense team argues necessitate a new trial. The primary element of the appeal centers around the instructions given to the jury and the admission of expert witnesses who were not qualified under court standards. Milton’s defense claims that the jury was misled by improper and confusing instructions regarding the intent, or “scienter,” necessary to prove fraud.
Specifically, the defense argues that the court’s instruction on “willfulness” was incorrect because it did not clearly state that Milton had to know his actions were unlawful to be guilty. In other words, when Milton tweeted, he was referencing the business plan and had no intent to mislead anyone. The defense also contends that the wire fraud instructions were confusing, failing to properly convey that an intent to harm victims by depriving them of money or property was required for a conviction.
Another significant element of the appeal involves the admission of expert testimony from Dr. Dina Mayzlin, which Milton’s team argues was improperly allowed and lacked reliability and qualifications under the Daubert standard. They claim that her analysis of social media influence and investor behavior did not meet the necessary legal standards under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Mayzlin’s testimony was based on unreliable data and failed to provide meaningful, expert analysis that could aid the jury. Furthermore, the defense asserts that Mayzlin effectively became a “mouthpiece” for inadmissible hearsay, repeating unverified statements from outside sources without properly analyzing them.
Additionally, the appeal challenges the venue for Count Four of Milton’s conviction, arguing that the court made an instructional error on venue foreseeability. The defense claims that the government failed to prove that Milton could reasonably foresee that his actions related to the Utah Ranch deal would involve the Southern District of New York, which they did not. The government’s case, which relied on the alleged routing of payments through New York banks, was insufficient to establish proper venue, according to Milton’s legal team.
If procedural and evidentiary rules are ignored, as in Trevor’s trial, America risks becoming comparable to the kangaroo courts of countries with 100% conviction rates.
Judicial Errors and Bias
Trevor Milton’s appeal asserts that his trial was marred by significant judicial errors, profoundly affecting the jury’s decision-making process and undermining the fairness of the proceedings. A central claim is that the jury received faulty instructions on key elements of the charges against him, including the scienter (intent) standard and wire fraud elements. Milton’s defense argues these instructional errors were critical enough to warrant a new trial.
The scienter instructions, crucial to proving fraud, were fundamentally flawed, according to Milton’s legal team. Milton’s defense points to multiple Second Circuit rulings clarifying that a defendant must know their actions are unlawful to be guilty of securities fraud. After the trial, a third of the jury admitted in interviews with news outlets that “no intent was found during the 4-week trial,” which should have resulted in a completely innocent verdict if properly instructed. Unfortunately, the judge incorrectly told the jury that intent was not required for a guilty verdict.
Another cornerstone of the appeal is the admission of expert testimony. The trial judge allowed Dr. Dina Mayzlin to present what Milton’s team describes as unreliable and irrelevant junk science. Mayzlin’s testimony, which analyzed Milton’s social media influence, was based on unreliable data and lacked a clear methodological basis. Milton’s defense argues that the judge abdicated his gatekeeping role under Daubert—a standard requiring courts to ensure expert testimony is relevant, reliable, and not based on hearsay. Mayzlin’s conclusions, presented as expert analysis, were speculative interpretations based on weak data sources. The appeal also underscores the issue of jury confusion resulting from these instructional and evidentiary errors. The jury acquitted Milton on Count Two, the only count where they received correct instructions about scienter (intent), showing that when properly instructed, they did not find Milton had the intent to defraud. The defense argues that incorrect instructions on other counts resulted in the wrong verdict. The government’s closing arguments simplified fraud as mere deception, further confusing the jury’s understanding of the legal standards. A former prosecutor from the Southern District of New York stated that, based on the jury’s comments, Mr. Milton should have been acquitted of all charges.
Exculpatory Evidence
Milton’s appeal also highlights significant concerns regarding exculpatory evidence that was improperly excluded by the trial judge, potentially affecting the case’s outcome. The defense argues that critical evidence, which could have bolstered Milton’s innocence or mitigated perceptions of wrongdoing, was barred from being presented to the jury, depriving him of a fair trial.
One of the most pivotal pieces of excluded evidence was the trucks themselves, which the government claimed were fake. The judge denied the defense the opportunity to show the jury the trucks, despite the fact that the Badger was real, operational, and could drive.
Allowing the jury to see the real trucks might have shown them that Milton’s claims were not hidden deceptions but part of an innovative company’s forward-looking plans. This evidence exclusion was particularly damaging because it prevented the defense from providing a full, accurate picture of how Nikola operated in a highly speculative, innovation-driven industry. This context could have undermined the prosecution’s argument that Milton intentionally misled investors.
The defense could have presented internal communications, emails, and records showing Milton’s involvement in Nikola’s technology development and reliance on engineer input but was barred from doing so under false claims of company privilege. These communications would have shown the jury that Milton’s statements, even if overly optimistic, were rooted in his genuine belief in the company’s potential. Unfortunately, the government allowed Nikola to withhold these documents.
Deleted or Destroyed Evidence
In a stunning turn of events, Trevor learned that the government’s key witness, Peter Hicks, violated a subpoena and attempted to destroy up to 20,000 documents from his phone before trial. This information came to light when a federal judge ordered a forensic examination of his devices due to a lawsuit filed by the witness. These 20,000 documents, some of which show Trevor’s innocence, were never turned over to the defense.
After the deleted information was discovered post-trial, the witness continued to lie in a deposition, and only after being confronted with evidence did he alter his testimony, contradicting his trial statements. These revelations indicate the witness committed perjury, which should be enough to order a new trial. For instance, the witness planned to sue Mr. Milton following the Hindenburg report, undermining the government’s lulling argument and necessitating the dismissal of Count Four in Trevor’s indictment. A witness lying to the jury for personal gain deprives the defendant of a fair trial. The witness also attempted to extort Trevor for tens of millions while using his trial witness status to file a lawsuit for the same amount.
The witness lied about the stock options involved in the land transaction. Post-trial, a forensic examination of his devices revealed deleted text messages where he described the stock options as “fools’ gold” and speculated they would “probably be worthless tomorrow.” This bombshell evidence would have demonstrated to the jury that this witness was lying and untrustworthy. However, this evidence was withheld, violating the subpoena and Trevor’s right to a fair trial.
Additional witnesses came forward post-trial, telling Mr. Milton they had informed the government and company of information that could have exonerated him. They wondered why they were not called to the stand, and this exculpatory information, potentially a Brady violation, was never presented to Milton’s defense.
For example, one key witness informed Mr. Milton in a recording that he had told the government and company that Trevor was referring to the business model in statements using present-tense verbs. It appears that notes from these interviews were destroyed, depriving Trevor of a fair trial.
Summary of Appeal
In summary, hiding exculpatory evidence from the jury and destroying evidence can lead to wrongful convictions. The exclusion of key evidence—from preventing the jury from seeing the allegedly fake trucks to Nikola’s CFO’s notes stating “Trevor is not fraudulent”—and giving the jury incorrect instructions about intent contributed to an unjust outcome.
These pieces of evidence would have shown the jury a more complete picture, portraying Milton not as a deceitful founder but as a visionary entrepreneur operating within the bounds of a high-risk, innovative industry. The fact remains: the trucks were real and are in production today, with Nikola beating even the largest OEMs to market. For the government to hold a press conference claiming the Badger was fake and immobile, while preventing the defense from showing the real vehicle, underscores the fundamental flaws in our justice system.
These combined factors—judicial errors, jury confusion, and improper admission of expert testimony—form the basis of Milton’s appeal. His defense asserts that had the jury received proper instructions, been shielded from unreliable expert testimony, and fully understood the legal requirements of the charges, the outcome might have been different. Thus, Milton’s appeal is not merely about challenging the sufficiency of the evidence but about ensuring that the legal standards were correctly applied and that the jury had a fair opportunity to assess the case based on accurate legal instructions.
No money was ever missing. No funds were misappropriated. No filings were false or fake. No evidence was destroyed. No allegations of insider trading were made. No other employees were charged. In other words, Trevor was indicted over his words, with no one else facing charges for similar statements. If this is the new standard for justice, it could open the door to indicting employees and officers in every American company for promoting their products.
This points to strong grounds for a new trial and raises serious concerns about whether justice was truly served during Milton’s initial trial.